Divorce-Support of Children-Modification-Notice of Motion.-A defendant in a divorce action over whom the court has secured jurisdiction cannot avoid the continuing jurisdiction of the court to change its orders for support of children by discharging his attorney and moving out of the state. Hence, an order in the ex.ercise of such jurisdiction may be predicated on an order to show cause and notice of motion served on the attorney of record in the action, although the defendant has departed from the state and has formally discharged his attorney. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1015.) [2] Id.-Support of Children-Modification-Notice of Motion.-Service of notice of motion to modify a divorce judgment as
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Divorce and Separation, § 300(2); [3] Divorce and Separation, § 182; [4] War, § 10. Feb. 1943] 73D7-l)-C REYNOLDSV. REYNOLDS [21 C;2d 580j 681 respects the allowance for support ofchiIdre~ may :b~,:m:aae, upon the defendant's attorney of record in· the . a~tion·'tinm . a change of attorneys is made hi the manner' prescribed:·~t law or until the discharge of·the attorney is noted in' the record. In case of such a discharge, service may. be made. on' the clerk of the court. [3] ld.-Counsel Fees and Costs-Notice o.f Application;...,.. A·nO'-. ticeof motion for allowance of attorney's feef!latid,.costs. :on appeal from an order modifying .a divorce judgmetitmay be served on the· attorneys appomted to challenge. the ju;isdic~ tion of the court to entertain tp.e motion and' to.represen~tlie party. on appeal, although th.e prescribed proce:dure. for)~~stt tution of attorneys was not followed. per month. The affidavit of service states that these papers were ,i addressed to the attorneys of record for said defend~ ant at the office address of said attorneys,as follows: Loucks and Phister ... San Pedro, California." .An affidavit shows that copies of the papers were also sent by registeredtnail to the defendant at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, where he was then stationed as an officer ·of the United States Army. Attached to this affidavit is' a registry return receipt signed by defendant acknowledging delivery in Iowa on November 4, 1940. On the day appointed for a hearing, a special appearance was, made by defendant's counsel of record on these appeals for the sole. purpose' of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that defendimt, a nonresident, had not been persomtlly served with notice within-this state, ,that E. O. Loucks had not been counsel for defendant for more than three years, and that service by mail upon his firm was ineffeGtive. In an affidavit filed in support of this objection defendant stated that E. O. Lou.cks did not represent him after April 7, 1937, and that he wrote to Loucks on October 20, 1937, discharging him as his attorney. An affidavit by Loucks fully corroborated defendant's affidavit and stated that on October 31, 1940 (the day on which the notice of motion presumably was received), Loucks wrote plaintiff's counsel that his relationship as attorney for defendant officially terminated iIi October, 1937. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction, and the hearing on' the motion was continued. When the matter again came on for hearing defendant offered affidavits showing that although the name "Loucks and Phister" had been signed to the pleadings in the case in 1934, E. O. Loucks was in fact the only person , whom defendant had authorized to represent him, and that . the firm of Loucks and Phister had dissolved in February, 1937 . The trial court refused to consider these affidavits and after the overruling of renewed 'objections to the jurisdiction of the court, defendant's counsel took no further part in the proceeding. The court heard plaIntiff's testimony and granted the motion, and the first of the present appeals was then taken. Plaintiff thereupon made a motion for an order requiring defendant to pay her $650 to defray costs and attorney's fees OD the appeal from the support order. This notice was served upon Fresfon and Files, the attorp.eys who , appeared specially at the hearing of-the previous motion and who took the appeal from the support order. At the hear-
ing on the motion for attorney fees,Fresto~ and Files again" appeared specially to, object to thejurisdictiori olthe court and presented an affidavit that they had no authority. to do more. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction, and counsel took no further part in the proceedings. The court granted the motion, and defendant's secondapp,eal followed.
[1] The first question is whether the service of the notice and order to show cause upon the attorneys who represented the defendant iIi the divorce action was valid as a service upon attorneys then of, record. After app.earancein an action a defendant or his .attorney is entitled to notice, of all subsequent proceedings of which notice is required to~e given. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014.) Section 1015 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "When a plaintiff Or a defen.
dant, who has appeared, resides out of the State, and has no attorney in the action or proceeding, the service maybe made on the clerk or On the justice where there is no clerk, for him. But in all casesl -where. a party haB an attorney in the action or proceeding, the service of papers, when re, qtiired, must be upon the attorney instead of the party" except certain papers not 'here involved. This provision is clearly constitutional, for it is established that the Legisla~ ture may provide that once the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a proceeding and over the [21 C.2d in the Moore case, where the court set forth reasons that convincingly support the vaiidityof the service in the present case. The court stated, however, that it would seem to be a question of fact whether a party was represented in such a proceeding by an attorney of record. This statement was unnecessary to the decision, for the proceeding was in certiorari and the holding was that even if the trial court had committed error a writ of review would not' lie. A client may of cOurse discharge his attorney at any time (see 3 Cal.Jur. 628,,635), but 'during the course of a proceeding service of papers on the attorney of record, where service upon the attorney is proper, birids the client until the attorney is discharged or substituted out of the. case in the. manner provided'by law. (Grant v. White, 6 Cal. 55, 56; Scarpel, v, East Bay Street Rys., 42 Cal.App.2d 32 [115 P.2d 862] .) The court is concerned in such cases not with whether the client is represented by' an attorney, but whether he has an attorney of record, whether, any change in attorneys has beim made as provided. in section 284. of the Code of Civil ProGedure, and whether notice, thereof has been given as provided in section 285 of' that code. The authority of an attorney, however, ordinarily ends with the entry of judgment, 'except for the purpose of enforcing it or having it set ,aside or reversed. (See 3 Cal.Jur. 668.) Nevertheless the judgment of divorce insofar as it relates to the custody and maintenance of minor children is not final. As to 'those matterS the litigation must' be' regarded as, still pending (Rosher v; Superior Court, 9,CaL2d 556, 560 [71 P.2d 9i8J ; Lamborn v; Lamborn, 190 Cal. 794 [214 P. 862] ; AvilaV '. Leonardo, ' 53 CaLApp.2d'602, 608 [128. P.2d 43] ), and the provisions of section 1015 apply as well after as before the entry of the judgment. (Moore v. Superior Court, 2030a1. 238, '242 [263 P. 1009 see 78 A.L.R. 370, 376 .) The attorney of record is the person the client has named as his agent upon whom service of ,papers maybe made. The statutes informed defendant that if he had no attorney of recordthe clerk of the court became his agent for the purpose of service. The burden lay upon the defendant to keep an attorney of record or to make such arrangements' for notice with the clerk as he thought ord, plaintiff could have made service on, the clerk of the court. The record, however, showed Loucks and J?hist~r' as counsel, and the court and opposing counsel were' entitled' til rely thereon until it was changed·. in, the manner prescribed by law.
. , , [3] The service on Freston and Files of the notice of~o tionfor allowance of attorneys' fees and costs' o~!' appeal was aJsovalid. They appeared specially to challenge the. jilris-. diction of, the court on the first motion and'tHed a notice <if ~appeal from the order granting that motion. Upon'aprope:r 'showingplaintitf is entitled to suit 'money to prel;ierlfher';si(;le on appeal and be represented by counsel. (Lambo1:rI,'V; , born, 0 CaL 794 [214P.8621"j Parker v, par; ke, .; '22"Ca.l : fault ,of any appearance by the, defendant, the plaintiff; before entering judgment shall file in the court an, affidavit setting forth· facts' showing that the defendant· is not in military service. If unable to file such affidavit plaintiff ,shall in lieu'thereOf file an affidavit setting forth either that 'the defendant is. in the military service or tliatplaintiff is not aple to determine. whether or n'(jt defendant is in such'service.
If an affidavit is not filed show,ingthat the defendant is not in the'· military service; no judgment shall . be entered without first securing an order of court directing such entry, and no such order shall be made, if the defendant is in' such service until' after the court shali have appollited an attorney.torepresent defendant and protect his interest. ,and ESTATE OF BALDWIN [21 C.2d the court shall on application' make such appointment." This section is designed to protect a defendant in military service who does not appear, by insuring the appointment of an attorney to represent him. It doeEf not apply, however,when; as in the present case, the defendant has appointed his own attorneys _ to protect his interest. There is no "aefault of any appearance" in such a case even though the defendant chooses to make only a special appearance to con--test the jurisdiction of the court and therefore limits the _ authority of his attorneys to that issue. If that course proves ineffective he can hardly contend that he was not represented by counsel. There is nothing in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act requiring the court to disregard the appointment of attorneys by the defendant and the course of action he decides upon and to appoint another attorney to embark upon another course of action on defendant's behalf. [3] Real Property -..,; Interest. -The words "interest" and -"title" are not synonymous.
[4] Decedents' Estates-Partial Distribution-Who M:l.Y Petition.
-A person seeking distribution of a part of estatc property need not be entitled to all the attributes of ownership therein, in order to maintain his application. [5a, 5b] !d.-Partial Distribution-Opposition.-The fact that the personal representatives of an estate opposed an application for ratable distribution filed by a receiver entitled to possession of a legacy does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate where the dispute does not involve obje(',-tiori by the legatee.
[6] Id.-..,;Firial Distribution-To Assignees or Grantec~Disputes.
-The rule as to a court's lack of power to determine disputes concerning the existence or the validity of the right asserted as the basis for distribution of a decedent's prop--erty otherwise than in conformity with the terms of the will or the law of succession, applies only in case of controversie~ between the parties directly affected, that _ is, between the heir, devisee or legatee and the contesting claimant.
[7] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Receiver-Oollateral At, tack.-An order in a divorce action appointing a receiver to reduce a legacy to possession is not subject to collateral attack in the probate proceeding where the order is valid on its face. [8] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction-Scope.-A court sitting in probate has jurisdiction to apply rules in equity or prinei, pIes of law when required to decide a qu"estion demanding settlement. It has the same power as the superior court in law and equity cases to hear and determine, in the mode pro~ vided by law, all questions of law and fact, the disposition of which is necessary to a proper judgment.
[9] Id.-Partial Distribution-Opposition-By lteceivcr.-A receiver authorized to take possession of a legacy is a person
[6] See ilB Oal.Jur. 799.
[8] See llA Oal.Jur. 91.
